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ENFORCEMENT OF JUSTICE COURT JUDGMENTS
By ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT, of the Denver Bar

NE of the widely used methods of enforcing a judgment of a Justice of the Peace Court is that of filing a
transcript of such judgment in the District Court and
then obtaining an execution on the District Court judgment.
The effectiveness of such a device in collecting such judgments
is seriously limited by the limited number of years, such procedure is available after rendition of the judgment. There
seems to be some question as to exactly how long such a District Court judgment is valid and enforceable.
The decisions of our Supreme Court have shown a
change in the development of the law with respect to Justice
Court judgments filed in the District Court and then made a
basis for execution out of the District Court. The earliest
Colorado case involving this point is the case of Brown v.
Bell, 46 Colo. 163, 103 Pac. 380, 23 L. R. A. (NS) 1096,
133 Am. St. Rep. 54 (1909), wherein the judgment creditor
obtained a Justice Court judgment and filed a transcript in the
District Court within one year thereafter. The judgment
creditor then attempted, at a time which was more than six
years after the Justice Court judgment was rendered, to obtain
execution out of the District Court. The defense was that
the statute of limitations (which is now Section 6492, Compiled Laws 1921) barred such an execution. The court held,
however, that an execution might be issued even though the
six-year statute of limitations had run against an action on
the judgment.
The next case, Sundin v. Frost, 71 Colo. 367, 206 Pac.
1071 (1 922), involved a slightly different set of facts in that
the judgment creditor did not file the transcript of the Justice
Court judgment in the District Court until almost ten years
after the Justice Court judgment had been rendered. He then
sought execution from the District Court. The judgment
debtor brought an action to restrain the enforcement of this
District Court execution. The court enjoined the enforcement
of this execution on the theory that the judgment became dormant and afforded no basis for an action and could not be
made the ground for an execution from the District Court by
274
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filing a transcript of such judgment with the clerk of the District Court. The court distinguished the Brown v. Bell case
on the facts because in the Brown v. Bell case the transcript
was filed in the District Court before six years had elapsed,
while in the instant case the transcript was filed in the District
Court after six years had elapsed.
The problem was definitely settled by the case of Reed v.
Flood, 76 Colo. 139, 230 Pac. 108 (1924), where the facts
were almost identical with the Brown v. Bell case in that the
judgment creditor filed his transcript of the Justice Court
judgment with the clerk of the District Court within three
years after the judgment was rendered and then sought to have
execution issued almost ten years after the Justice Court judgment was rendered. This case presented squarely the problem
of how long a Justice Court judgment was effective for purposes of execution out of the District Court. The court very
definitely held that the Justice Court judgment was effective
for a period of six years after the date of its rendition in the
Justice Court. The holding of this case is to the effect that
the judgment is "dead" after six years have expired and that
no execution could issue on such judgment no matter when
the transcript of such judgment was filed in the District
Court. The court discussed the Brown-Bell and the Sundin
cases and noted that the Sundin case was antagonistic on principle with the Brown-Bell; decided to follow the principle
enunciated in the Sundin case and in effect overruled the decision in the Brown-Bell case.
It may therefore safely be said that the Reed v. Flood
case has definitely established the proposition that an execution cannot issue out of the District Court on a transcript of a
judgment which has been rendered by a Justice Court after
six years have elapsed from the rendition of Justice Court
judgment, and this rule applies no matter when the transcript
of the Justice Court judgment is filed in the District Court
within or after the six years' period.
In addition to granting a right to convert a Justice Court
judgment into a District Court judgment, the statutes (Sec.
254 of the Code-and Sec. 5898, C. L. '21) provide for recording a transcript of the District Court judgment in the
office of the Recorder and thus constituting this recorded
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transcript a lien on all real property of the judgment debtor
for a period of six years.
The case of Davis Bros. Drug Co. v.Counter, 75 Colo.
239, 245 (1924), presented the question as to when the lien
was created. The court in that case held that when a Justice
Court transcript was filed in the District Court and a transcript of the District Court judgment was recorded in the office of the Clerk and Recorder that the six years were computed from the date of rendition of the Justice Court judgment and that the lien did not begin at the time the District
Court judgment was rendered.
Since it is a statute of limitations which bars the enforcement of a District Court judgment-based on a transcript
from the Justice Court, there is the possibility that the running of the statute of limitations may be suspended by absence
of the judgment debtor from the state. In New England
Electric Co. v. Willis Bowes, 89 Colo. 547, 2 P. (2d) 245,
the judgment creditor attempted to secure an execution and
levy on a transcript of a Justice Court judgment which was
filed in the District Court more than nine years after the Justice Court judgment had been rendered. The defense set up
the six-year statute of limitations barred such an execution
and levy. The judgment creditor then contended that under
Sec. 6417, C. L. '21, the operation of the statute of limitations was suspended because the judgment debtor was out of
the state during part of this period. This case presented the
question whether a Justice Court judgment was "dead" after
six years as the court had said in the Reed v. Flood case or
whether the running of the statute of limitations might be
tolled by the absence of the judgment debtor from the state.
The court disposed of the case on the theory that the Act did
not operate retrospectively and the absence of the defendant
began before the statute was passed. However, the court did
intimate that perhaps Section 6417 did not apply to Justice
Court judgments and their transcripts in the District Court
because Section 6417 refers to "causes of action" and not to
"judgments." Some further doubt is cast upon the probable
uses of Section 6417 by the language of the court: "After a
lapse of six years, the Justice Court judgment was dead.
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Thereafter no valid transcript could be filed in the District
Court and no execution issued thereon."
In conclusion it would seem that a transcript of a judgment in a Justice of the Peace Court may be filed in the District Court and then a transcript of such District Court judgment may be recorded in the office of the Recorder as a lien
against the real property of the judgment debtor, such lien
then existing for six years after the date of the rendition of
the judgment in the Justice Court; or an execution may issue
upon the District Court judgment at any time until six years
from the date of the rendition of the judgment in the Justice
Court. There is a very slim possibility that the time during
which an execution might issue out of the District Court
might be extended beyond a six-year period under Section
6417 of the Compiled Laws of 1921 in the event that the
judgment debtor was absent from the state during such time,
but in the light of the unfavorable language of the court in
The New England Electrical Co. v. Bowes, this possibility is
quite slim indeed.
DID YOU KNOW?
A Massachusetts law makes the promotion of a masked ball

illegal?
The laws of Alabama and Vermont empower a husband to chastise his wife, using "a stick no larger than the thumb" (but do not
mention the length of the stick) ?
A Maine law prohibits the wearing of spiked shoes in public?
A New York state law makes it unlawful to feed a sparrow?
A Los Angeles ordinance makes it unlawful for anyone to shoot
at a jackrabbit or a hare from the platform of a trolley car in transit?
A law of the town of Kulpoont, Pa., holds it illegal to keep a

prisoner in jail on Sundays?

